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1979] RECENT CASES 559
Hopefully the unusual factual and procedural situation in Jackson will be
distinguished by other courts and the resulting impact of the decision will
be slight. On the other hand, if Jackson is followed, the result could be
even more confusion.
ELIZABETH D. BADGER




In 1965, the United States Supreme Court implicitly approved the use
of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury in the trial of a
black defendant. The case, Swain v. Alabama,2 involved a black defen-
dant convicted of rape by an all-white jury. All six blacks in the venire had
been peremptorily stricken by the prosecution. In addition, no black had
•served on a petit jury in that county for at least twelve years, although
10-15% of veniremen during that period had been black.3 The defendant
contended that this course of conduct violated the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court flatly rejected his claim, concluding that the use of
peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from a particular jury does not
offend the Constitution. 4 This result was based on a presumption that a
prosecutor uses his peremptories to obtain a fair and impartial jury.5 This
presumption was not overcome, the Court said, by allegations that in the
case at hand all blacks were stricken.
The peremptory challenge is one which may be exercised during voir
dire to exclude a prospective juror without assigning any reason. Unlike
1. 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
2. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
3. Id. at 205. In fact, defendant alleged that there had never been a black
on a petit jury in either a civil or criminal case in that county. Id. at 222-23.
4. Apparently, the dissenters agreed with the majority on this point, 380
U.S. at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Thus it appears that not a single justice on
what was probably the most liberal Supreme Court in history believed that the
peremptory exclusion of black jurors in a single case, without proof of systematic
exclusion, violated constitutional principles.
5. The validity of this presumption is doubtful. In any voir dire, each at-
torney will strive, not for a jury without bias, but for the most biased jury
possible-in his favor. Kuhn,Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 235, 286 (1968). 1
Scott: Scott: Peremptory Challenges of a Cognizable Group
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
challenges for cause, peremptory challenges traditionally need not be
defended by the attorney nor approved by the judge. 6 The existence of the
challenge is based in part on the inadequacy of challenges for cause in
minimizing jury bias.7 An attorney can peremptorily strike a potential
juror whom he believes to be, but cannot prove to be, biased.8 The number
of peremptory challenges allotted to each side is determined by statute,
and will vary depending on the jurisdiction, the type of action and the par-
ty the attorney is representing.9 The challenge originated for the protec-
tion of the accused, "a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to
prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous." 10 It has been used
frequently, however, to exclude certain groups, particularly blacks, from
jury service.II
In Swain, the Court indicated in dicta that a pattern of systematic ex-
clusion of blacks from jury service might violate the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 2 As an example, the Court suggested that if a county prosecutor
peremptorily struck blacks "in case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be...
with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries," the fourteenth
amendment claim would take on added significance.' 3 Whether the Court
intended this dicta to represent a minimum standard for establishing
systematic exclusion is debatable. However, lower federal courts and state
courts have unanimously accepted the language as their test. In all cases
after Swain in which courts have dealt with the issue, no defendant has
successfully established systematic exclusion. Swain was specifically relied
on for support in most of these cases. ' 4
6. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES, 145 (1977).
7. Grounds for challenge for cause are generally quite narrow and unreal-
istic. Kuhn, supra note 5, at 243. See, e.g., State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 126
S.W.2d 256 (1939) (veniremens former Ku Klux Klan membership not ground
for challenge for cause in murder trial of black defendant). In addition, a pro-
spective juror who admits prejudice or bias may not be excluded if he can con-
vince the court that he can lay aside his feelings and judge the case with an open
mind. Kuhn, supra at 243; Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the
Community, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1417, 1429 (1969).
8. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 146.
9. A fairly up-to-date table containing this information is found inJ. VAN
DYKE, supra note 6, at 281-84, Appendix D.
10. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 346.
11. The cases are too numerous for citation. For a recent compilation of
decisions dealing with the issue, see Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (1977).
12. The Court was not required to decide this issue because the record did
not establish that the state alone, as opposed to the defense, was responsible for
the exclusion of blacks. 380 U.S. at 224. Justice Harlan, concurring in Swain,
specifically stated that it was his opinion that the Court did not decide this ques-
tion. 380 U.S. at 228 (Harlan, J., concurring).
13. 380 U.S. at 223.
14. See, e.g., authorities cited note 49 infra.
[Vol. 44
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As adopted by the courts, Swain's burden for defendants has been de-
nounced as nearly impossible, and the case itself has been heavily criticized
for perpetuating systematic exclusion.1 5 Systematic exclusion of certain
groups from jury service affects more than the fair trials of individual
defendants. It also prevents participation by the excluded classes in the
judicial process.' 6
Swain has also been attacked on the ground that it did not go far
enough, since the Constitution guarantees impartiality of the jury itself,
not merely the venire. Due process and equal protection safeguards
created by a representative jury panel may be obliterated by skewing the
petit jury through peremptory challenges. In fact, Swain has been
repeatedly condemned for subordinating a constitutional right to the exer-
cise of a non-constitutional procedural device.17 The defendant's burden is
so great, it has been said, that constitutional rights are left inadequately
protected. 18
People v. Wheeler 19 confronted the California Supreme Court with a
similar claim of prosecutorial misuse of peremptories. Two black defen-
dants were charged with murder. During voir dire, a number of black
veniremen 20 were questioned and passed for cause. However, each black
was then peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor and stricken. The jury
which subsequently convicted the defendants was all white. The California
Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial,
15. E.g., Bradshaw, Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases-Trial by a
Jury of Whose Peers?, 33J. Mo. BAR 170 (1977); Kuhn, supra note 5; Note, supra
note 7; Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at
Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Louis U.L. REv. 622 (1974); Com-
ment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the
All- White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966); Comment, FairJury Selection Pro-
cedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322 (1966); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge:
Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1976); Note, 79
HARV. L. REV. 135 (1965).
16. Bradshaw, supra note 15, at 176.
17. See, e.g., Bradshaw, supra note 15, at 176; Kuhn, supra note 5, at
287-88; Note, supra note 7, at 1431; Comment, supra note 15, 18 ST. LOUIS U. L.
REV. at 666-67.
18. Kuhn, supra note 5, at 302. There is ample opportunity for blacks to ex-
perience prosecutorial misuse of peremptories. Blacks represented 11.6% of the
United States population in 1977, but they were the subject of 25.7% of total
arrests in that year. 33.5 % of the persons arrested for serious crimes were black,
including 47% of forcible rape, 51% of non-negligent homicide, and 57% of
robbery arrests. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1978 (99th ed.).
19. 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
20. Defendants' counsel asserted at trial, and defendants contended on ap-
peal, that seven blacks were excluded. The prosecutor never conceded that figure
as correct, but the California Supreme Court found the matter immateriil. Id. at
763 n.20, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904 n.20.
1979]
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holding that the prosecutor's conduct violated defendants' right to trial by
impartial jury as guaranteed by the California Constitution. 2'
Laying the groundwork for its decision, the Wheeler court first re-
viewed a line of United States Supreme Court decisions underscoring the
importance of the representative cross-section rule. This rule emanates
from the sixth amendment right to trial by impartial jury and is applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 22 The representative
cross-section rule prohibits the systematic exclusion from jury venires of
any significant group distinguishable from the general population.23
However, upon recent consideration of the rule, the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the rule does not require the
jury actually chosen to be representative of the community. 24 As required
by the federal constitution, the representative cross-section rule applies to
the selection of jury wheels and venires, but not to the selection of petit
juries from those larger pools.25
The California court in Wheeler determined that the representative
cross-section requirement is guaranteed equally by the United States and
California Constitutions, but that the cross-section rule as interpreted
under the California Constitution should be extended to include voir
dire. 26 "[A] party is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that is as near an
approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of
random draw permits." The court observed that although a peremptory
challenge is one for which no reason need be given, this does not mean that
no reason need exist. Declaring that peremptory strikes based on group
bias alone frustrate the purposes of the representative cross-section rule,
the Wheeler court held that such strikes violate the California Constitu-
tion's guarantee of trial by impartial jury. 27
21. "Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all.... CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 16. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury.. . ."); MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a) ([T]he right of trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed shall remain inviolate .. ").
22. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
23. Note, 7 CONN. L. REv. 508, 527 (1975).
24. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975). To require petit juries to
actually represent each group in the community would require court officials to
select jurors individually. Aside from the potential for abuse, such a requirement
might necessitate compilation and consideration of large amounts of informatioh
about each individual juror (e.g., race, sex, age, religion, education, etc.), in
order to ensure representativeness. Note, supra note 15, at 1732. Some significant
population segments could never appear on a "representative" jury, being too
small to appear in a sample of twelve.
25. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975).
26. Although the California court cites several United States Supreme Court
cases as support, it is obvious in light of Swain that the court's holding can be
based on the California Constitution alone.
27. The court defined "group bias" as a presumed bias based solely on
racial, religious, ethnic or similar grounds. "Specific bias" on the other hand,
[Vol. 44
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The Swain presumption that an attorney is using his peremptories in a
constitutional manner is retained in Wheeler. However, the chief impor-
tance of Wheeler's holding is that, unlike Swain, the presumption is rebut-
table in a single case. To make a prima facie case against his opponent, a
party must establish on the record that the persons excluded are part of a
cognizable group for purposes of the representative cross-section rule.28 A
cognizable group might be defined in terms of any identifiable group
characteristic that results in a sharing of distinctive experiences and
perspectives. 29 The Supreme Court has held that racial groups30 and
women s constitute cognizable groups. Lower courts have recognized
groups defined by ethnic background, 32 religion 3 and occupation. 34
The second element of a prima facie case requires a party to show on
the record a "strong likelihood" that the questioned challenges are based
on group association alone. Relevant evidence includes: the opponent's
striking of most group members from the venire or the use of a dispropor-
tionate number of his peremptories against the group; the opponent's
failure to engage these jurors in more than desultory questioning; the fact
that the only characteristic shared by the jurors in question is their group
membership; and the defendant's membership in the excluded group or
the alleged victim's membership in the group to which a majority of the re-
maining jurors belong.3 5
relates to the particular case on trial or the parties or witnesses involved.
Swain based his constitutional attack on the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection guarantee. The Wheeler decision, on the other hand, is grounded on
the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the California Constitution. The
California court explicitly refused todistinguish the cases on this ground, assum-
ing that the United States Supreme Court would reaffirm Swain and reach the
same result under the representative cross-section rule as it did under the equal
protection clause. 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
28. Id. at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
29. Note, supra note 15, at 1736.
30. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967).
31. See Duren v. Missouri, 99 S. Ct. 246 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
32. See United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 115 F. Supp. 392 (D.V.I.
1953), rev'd on other grounds, 212 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1974) (persons of Puerto
Rican descent); International Longshoremen's & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82
F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.),
aff'd, 342 U.S. 859 (1951) (Filipinos); State v. Plenty Horse, 85 S.D. 401, 184
N.W.2d 654 (1971) (American Indians).
33. SeeJuarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925) (Roman
Catholics).
34. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (daily wage
earners); International Longshoremen's & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82 F.
Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.), aff'd,
342 U.S. 859 (1951) (wage earners); Simmons v. State, 182 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1966)
(manual laborers).
35. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
5
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If the court finds that a prima facie showing has been made, the
burden shifts to the opponent to show that the challenges were not based
on group bias alone. Justifications need not rise to the level of a challenge
for cause. However, the grounds must be reasonably relevant to the par-
ticular case on trial, its parties or its'witnesses. A showing that members of
the majority group or other groups were challenged on comparable
grounds would also be relevant.3 6 If any of the questioned challenges can-
not be justified on grounds of specific bias, the jurors already selected must
be dismissed and the remaining venire quashed. The jury selection process
then must begin anew.
The state, as well as an individual defendant, is constitutionally enti-
tled to invoke the representative cross-section rule under the Wheeler
approach. However, the court specifically declined to pass on the applica-
bility of its decision to civil cases. 37
The Wheeler procedure is one of a number of suggested solutions to
the peremptory challenge problem. Other proposals include a strict
scrutiny/compelling state interest analysis, 38 elimination of peremptory
challenges by the state, 39 elimination of all peremptories, 40 or the
allowance of a very limited number (perhaps three to five) of "true"
peremptories to each side.4' The last approach would probably require a
corresponding expansion of the scope of voir dire questioning to permit a
more informed and individualized exercise of the limited number of
challenges. 42
Since the Swain decision, writers have urged the courts to allow a
defendant to question the use of peremptory challenges in his own case.
43
Wheeler, however, is not a panacea: The approach carries potential prob-
lems. Trials may be unreasonably disrupted or delayed by objection to
peremptory challenges. Extensive sham questioning, in an attempt to
amass a credible record to support a claim of reasonable peremptory
challenge, could also delay proceedings. Further, parties could con-
ceivably be restrained from challenging certain jurors for legitimate
reasons. 44 Another significant problem is hinted at in Wheeler's com-
panion case, People v. Johnson.45
In Johnson, a rape prosecution, one of the state's key witnesses had
referred to a black man fleeing the scene as "the nigger." That reference
was an important element in the process of identification linking the
36. Id. at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
37. Id. at n.29.
38. Note, supra note 7, at 1432.
39. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 167.
40. Id. at 167-68.
41. Id. at 169.
42. Note, supra note 15, at 1741.
43. See, e.g., Kuhn, supra note 5, at 303; Note, supra note 7, at 1433.
44. Kuhn, supra note 5, at 294.
45. 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978).
[Vol. 44
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defendant to the offense charged, and the prosecutor had strong reason to
believe that the racial epithet would come out at trial. He admitted on the
record that he intended to peremptorily strike every, black juror that he
could, because he was concerned that his witness' derogatory remark
would arouse hostility among black jurors. Wheeler had held that upon a
prima facie showing of improper use, the burden shifted to the questioned
attorney to show that the suspicious strikes "were not predicated on group
bias alone.'46 By implication, if the attorney had a bona fide, good faith
reason for the peremptory challenge other than the venireman's group af-
filiation, the attorney would have met his burden. In other words, so long
as the proffered justification was not a sham, it appears that a court would
not question the attorney's judgment concerning its relevance. InJohnson,
the California Supreme Court found, as a matter of law, that the perhaps
realistic possibility of juror hostility feared by the prosecutor was an insuf-
ficient justification for peremptory strikes. TheJohnson court required the
challenging party to justify questioned peremptory challenges "on grounds
unrelated to group affiliation. 14 7 Thus, as construed inJohnson, Wheeler
may do more than prohibit peremptory strikes based on group affiliation
alone- it could forbid any consideration of a venireman's group affiliation
in determining whether to exercise a peremptory challenge.
Assuming that the "group blind" peremptory challenge is a wise
goal, 48 the aforementioned requirements may pose significant difficulties
for an attorney exercising peremptory challenges against members of
cognizable groups. Upon' determination that a prima facie case of im-
proper use has been made, Wheeler requires a questioned attorney to show
a reason other than group bias for each questioned challenge. If the
reasoning ofJohnson is broadly construed, he would further have to show
that the juror's race was not considered by him at all in deciding to exercise
the challenge.
Wheeler represents a radical break from traditional concepts con-
cerning peremptory challenges. By contrast, Missouri cases have consis-
tently rejected defendants' attacks against peremptory exclusion of blacks
by psecutors. 9 The Missouri position is exemplified by State v.
46. Id. at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 775, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 916 (emphasis added).
48. In appropriate circumstances, the race, religion, sex, nationality, occu-
pation or affiliation of prospective jurors may be a relevant consideration in at-
tempting to select the most impartial jurors from a venire. Id. at 770, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 911.(Richardson, J., dissenting).
49. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. EiiBanc 1975)'(all foui
blacks stricken); State v. Collor, 502 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. 1973) (all stricken); State
v. Brown, 470 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. 1971) (all stricken); State v. Brookins, 468
S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1971) (all stricken); Clark v. State, 465 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1971)
(all stricken); State v. Smith, 465 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. 1971) (all 13 stricken); State v.
Huddleston, 462 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1971) (all four stricken); State v. Bradford,
462 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1971) (all stricken); State v. Davison, 457 S.W.2d 674 (Mo.
1970) (all 15 peremptories used to strike 15 of 17 blacks on panel); State v. Eaton.
1979] 565
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Baker, 50 wherein the defendant alleged a pattern of peremptory strikes
against blacks by the prosecutor in case after case, particularly where the
accused was also black. The Missouri Supreme Court in 1975 said that the
clear inference from this allegation was that blacks were not excluded from
juries where the accused was not black. Thus, the court concluded, the
allegation failed to meet the Swain requirement that the exclusion be
made in case after case "whoever the defendant or the victim may be...
with the result that no Negroes ever sit on petit juries."5 1
Baker and other Missouri cases show that the Swain viewpoint is firmly
entrenched in this state. 52 It is highly unlikely that Missouri will quickly
follow the Wheeler rationale. Nonetheless, if the Wheeler approach is suc-
cessful in California, it may prompt other states to modify their peremp-
tory challenge systems or their constitutional interpretations of fair trial. If
Wheeler's requirements prove to be unworkable, California itself may
reverse its position. California's attempt to balance these competing con-
siderations will be an interesting experiment.
DANIEL E. SCOTT
568 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978) (all three removed); State v. Hatten,
561 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978) (all three removed); State v. Williams,
535 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976) (all six removed); Ford v. State, 530
S.W.2d 25 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975) (in 16 trials involving black defendants in
Jackson County, all blacks removed); State v. Davis, 529 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1975) (in 31 trials of black defendants, 75% of blacks stricken; in 27
trials of white defendants, 40% of blacks stricken); State v. Brown, 527 S.W.2d
15 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975) (all seven stricken),State v. Jacks, 525 S.W.2d 431
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975) (all four stricken); State v. Booker, 517 S.W.2d 937
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974) (over 18 month period, 68% of blacks stricken); State
v. Langston, 515 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974) (all stricken); State v.
Dinkins, 508 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974) (only black on panel stricken);
State v. Kelly, 506 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974) (60% of peremptories
used to strike 100% of blacks who constituted 18% of panel).
50. 524 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. En Banc 1975) (reversed and remanded for re-
sentencing on other grounds).
51. Id. at 125, citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965).
52. Proposed legislation before the Missouri General Assembly would pro-
vide an even greater opportunity for prosecutorial misuse of peremptory
challenges than presently exists. House Bill 575 would give the state and the
defendant an equal number of peremptory challenges, in place of the present 2:1
ratio in favor of the defendant. It would also require alternating strikes between
the state and defense, rather than having the state exercise all of its challenges
before the defense uses any of its strikes. H.B. 575, 80th Gen. Ass'y, 1st Sess.
(1979). Senate Bill 18 is similar, except that in cases where multiple defendants
are tried together, the state would receive the same number of peremptories as all
defendants combined. S.B. 18, 80th Gen. Ass'y, 1st Sess. (1979). Each bill has
been recommended for passage by committee and is awaiting perfection.
[Vol. 44566
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